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Abstract
Ressentiment is central for understanding the psychological foundations of reactionary politics, right‐wing populism, Islamic
fundamentalism, and radicalism. In this article we theorise ressentiment as an emotional mechanism which, reinforcing
a morally superior sense of victimhood, expedites two parallel transvaluation processes: What was once desired or val‐
ued, yet unattainable, is reassessed as something undesirable and rotten, and one’s own self from being inferior, a loser,
is reassessed as being noble and superior. We establish negative emotions of envy, shame, and inefficacious anger as
the main triggers of ressentiment, with their associated feelings of inferiority and impotence, which target the vulnera‐
ble self. We identify the outcomes of ressentiment as other‐directed negative emotions of resentment, indignation, and
hatred, reinforced and validated by social sharing. Wemap the psychological structure of ressentiment in four stages, each
employing idiosyncratic defences that depend on the ego‐strength of the individual to deliver the transvaluation of the self
and its values, and finally detail how social sharing consolidates the outcome emotions, values, and identities in ressenti‐
ment through shallow twinship bonds with like‐minded peers. Our interdisciplinary theoretical account integrates classic
philosophical scholarship of ressentiment and its contemporary proponents in philosophy and sociology, which highlight
envy as the prime driver of ressentiment; it also considers the sociological approaches that focus on the repression and
transmutation of shame and its social consequences, as well as the psychoanalytic scholarship on psychic defences and
political psychology models on the emotionality of decision‐making. We conclude the article by elaborating the political
implications of ressentiment as the emotional mechanism of grievance politics.
Keywords
emotional mechanism; philosophy; political psychology; psychic defences; psychoanalysis; reactionism; resentment;
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1. Introduction
Aesop’s fable of the fox and the grapes tells of a fox’s
frustrated and repeated failures to reach the grapes
it covets, and ends with the fox’s scornful belittling
of the sour grapes. The technical term “ressentiment”
was introduced by Nietzsche (1885/1961) and elabo‐
rated by Scheler (1915/1961) to capture this insulat‐
ing and compensatory psychological phenomenon that
is distinguished from resentment. Despite its relevance
for understanding backlash and reactionary politics, not
much attention has been paid to its psychological profile.
In this article, we theorise ressentiment as an emo‐
tional mechanism, identify its psychological properties,
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outline its function for individuals and collectives, and
consider its implications for democratic politics. We start
from the premise that ressentiment is witnessed among
the powerless, disprivileged, and weak—including those
who experience their situation as precarious or vulnera‐
ble, however well positioned. We identify its main func‐
tion is to manage frustration through expediting two par‐
allel transvaluation processes: What was desired/valued,
yet unattainable, is reassessed as undesirable and rot‐
ten; and one’s own self from being inferior, a loser,
is reassessed as being noble and superior. We explain
how ressentiment employs effective (but eventually mal‐
adaptive) defences helping individuals resist their inse‐
curities and flaws without acknowledging or resolving
them. We also elaborate that the gains from ressenti‐
ment are evidenced in internal and external relations.
Internally, the mental pain of facing one’s perceived infe‐
riority and impotence is evaded, and the ressentimentful
individual feels righteous anger, resentment, and hatred.
In external relations, the “improvednewself” is validated
and maintained through social sharing with like‐minded
peers. The residual frustration, never fully repressed, tar‐
gets external objects (the establishment, political elites,
immigrants, media) perceived as hostile, bad or inferior,
and delivers rejection, vilification, and blame.
Ressentiment is identified as the affective driver of
reactionism, both on the political right and left (Capelos
& Demertzis, 2018; Capelos & Katsanidou, 2018; Capelos
et al., 2021; Sullivan, 2021). Ressentiment and its bitter
outcome emotions—resentment and hatred—are fea‐
tured in studies of right‐wing populism (Betz, 2005; Celis
et al., 2021; Ferrari, 2021; Hoggett et al., 2013; Kiss, 2021;
Mishra, 2017; Salmela & von Scheve, 2017), Islamic and
other forms of fundamentalism, fanaticism, extremism,
and radicalism (Griffin, 2012; Katsafanas, in press; Kaya,
2021; Langman &Morris, 2003; Mishra, 2017; Posłuszna
& Posłuszny, 2015), and have recently been linked to nar‐
cissism and cynicism (Capelos et al., 2021; Demertzis,
2020; Mayer & Nguyen, 2021).
Scholars of ressentiment agree it begins with neg‐
ative emotions and feelings targeting the vulnerable
self. The transvaluation of the self and its values allows
the projection of negative emotions towards generic
“all‐bad’’ others. However, there are several open ques‐
tions about ressentiment, namely: (1) Is it a com‐
plex emotion composed of other discrete emotions
(Demertzis, 2020; Rodax et al., 2021; TenHouten, 2018),
an emotional mechanism, a process which transforms
certain discrete emotions into others, or does it involve
both? (2) Which emotions constitute the feeling of
ressentiment, or drive it, and which emotions are its out‐
comes? (3) What are its stages and how do they engage
with psychic defences? (4) How does social sharing con‐
solidate its outcome emotions, values, and identities?
We make theoretical headway towards a concep‐
tualization of ressentiment integrating seemingly inde‐
pendent but complementary approaches: The classic
philosophical tradition (Nietzsche, 1885/1961; Scheler,
1915/1961) with its contemporary proponents in phi‐
losophy and sociology (Aeschbach, 2017; Demertzis,
2020; Elster, 1999; TenHouten, 2018; Ure, 2014) high‐
light envy as the prime driver of ressentiment; sociologi‐
cal approaches (Scheff, 1994; Turner, 2007) focus on the
repression and transmutation of shame and its social
consequences; political psychology studies operationalise
ressentiment as the affective driver of political reaction‐
ism (Capelos & Demertzis, 2018); insights from psycho‐
analytical works elaborate on the workings of psychic
defences (Bion, 1957; A. Freud, 1936; S. Freud, 1894; Klein,
1958, 1959; Kohut, 1984; Laing, 1961; Winnicott, 1971).
We begin with the nature of ressentiment as a com‐
plex emotion/sentiment, or an emotional mechanism
(Section 2). We substantiate our definition of ressenti‐
ment as an emotionalmechanismby identifying the emo‐
tions that are its drivers and its outcomes (Section 3).
Following psychoanalytical studies on defences, we map
out its four key stages (Section 4). We elaborate on social
sharing and its consolidating but socially maladaptive
function for the identity, emotions, and values of the
ressentimentful individual (Section 5). In conclusion we
discuss the implications of our contribution in under‐
standing reactionary politics.
2. Ressentiment: A Complex Emotion or an Emotional
Mechanism?
The categorization of ressentiment is an important ques‐
tion. Nietzsche and Scheler provide insightful sugges‐
tions on its nature: Nietzsche (1885/1961) tells us
how ressentiment functions in a “man of ressentiment”
and introduces transvaluation of the self and values
as its core, driven by emotions of envy, humiliation,
and inefficacious anger; Scheler (1961, p. 4) calls it
“a self‐poisoning of the mind which has quite definite
causes and consequences.” It is both a psychological
“mechanism” relating to the transvaluation of desired
but unattainable objects (Scheler, 1961, p. 65) and a “last‐
ing mental attitude, caused by the systematic repres‐
sion of certain emotions and affects” (Scheler, 1961,
p. 4). For Scheler, the “ressentiment attitude” consists of
“envy, the impulse to detract, malice, and secret vindic‐
tiveness…[that] have become fixed attitudes, detached
from all determinate objects” (Scheler, 1961, p. 24).
Such affective attitudes are interpreted as “sentiments”
by Aeschbach (2017), who characterizes the latter as
deeply rooted dispositions whose manifestations are
emotions requiring a specific coherence and stability in
the emotional episodes a subject is likely to feel. Yet both
Nietzsche and Scheler understand ressentiment first and
foremost as a psychological mechanism. Research in
philosophy and social sciences has followed Scheler in
identifying these two elements—psychological mecha‐
nism(s), and a sentiment‐like pattern of certain emotions
and attitudes—emphasizing either, or sometimes, simi‐
larly to Scheler, both (Aeschbach, 2017; Demertzis, 2020;
Elster, 1999; Salmela & von Scheve, 2017).
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Aeschbach (2017, p. 45) asks “whether or not ressen‐
timent constitutes an emotion, a sentiment, a mecha‐
nism, or a psychological process of its own.” Building on
Scheler, he sees ressentiment as a temporally extended
phenomenonwith different sequences and therefore dis‐
similar to emotions:
The POR [person of ressentiment] first values some‐
thing she cannot get which triggers a crushing expe‐
rience and, in response to this first stage, she har‐
bours hostile emotions directed against her existing
or imagined rivals. A feeling of inferiority, although
very characteristic, is not necessary; the fox for exam‐
ple is simply frustrated or experiences an unpleasant
feeling of impotence. What is common to all cases
however, and thus a necessary condition, is that the
man of ressentiment eventually alters the value of
what he cannot get or realise.We call thismechanism
the reevaluation process and claim that it is a defining
part of ressentiment. (Aeschbach, 2017, p. 93, italics
by the author)
Aeschbach characterizes ressentiment as a reevaluation
mechanism. At its core is the transvaluation of desired
but unattainable objects, whose unattainability gives rise
to unpleasant feelings of inferiority and impotence dam‐
aging the person’s self‐worth. Relating to value changes
of this kind, Aeschbach (2017, p. 69) suggests “ressenti‐
ment is the very mechanism that transmutes envy into
moral emotions such as resentment and indignation.” Yet
he also suggests ressentiment is an enduring “sentiment
characterised by a series of object‐specific dispositions
that consolidate into a character trait [the vice of ressen‐
timent] as the phenomenon progresses” (Aeschbach,
2017, p. 50).
As a sentiment, the manifestations of ressentiment
are “hostile emotions (revenge, envy) as well as blam‐
ing attitudes (resentment, indignation)” that Aeschbach
calls “ressentiment‐emotions” (Aeschbach, 2017, p. 55).
In this way, Aeschbach’s analysis replicates Scheler’s
original view about ressentiment as a sentiment and
a psychological mechanism. We agree an adequate
account of ressentiment must include both elements,
but their mutual relationship needs to be clarified in
greater detail.
Demertzis (2020), following Scheler, approaches
ressentiment as a “cluster emotion” or a “complex sen‐
timent.” He defines it as such:
An unpleasant complex moral sentiment with no spe‐
cific addressees, experienced by inferior individuals
including a chronic reliving of repressed and endless
vengefulness, hostility, hatred, envy, and resentment
due to the powerlessness of the subject in express‐
ing them, and resulting, at the level of moral values,
in the disavowal of what is unconsciously desired.
(Demertzis, 2020, p. 132)
Emotions of this kind are constituents of ressentiment
for Demertzis. Yet ressentiment is something else, for
it develops only when “anger, envy, hostility, hatred
and/or resentment… are incorporated and mutated into
ressentiment insofar as the transvaluation process is put
into motion initiated by the subject’s incapacity to act
out” (Demertzis, 2020, p. 136). Transvaluation has a cru‐
cial role in the development of ressentiment whose core
meaning it constitutes for Demertzis. Yet even if the
transvaluation is carried out by defences, their involve‐
ment does not turn ressentiment into a mechanism.
Quite the contrary, Demertzis argues “the transvaluation
process is in itself a configuration of defencemechanisms
and therefore it seems to me that it confers no added
value by dropping ressentiment out from the list of emo‐
tions” (Demertzis, 2020, p. 133). The logic of this argu‐
ment is that since ressentiment is brought about by psy‐
chological mechanisms, it cannot be a mechanism itself.
However, this is a non sequitur. This view of ressentiment
as a complex or cluster emotion generates more ques‐
tions than answers.
First, it leaves the relationship between ressentiment
and its constituent emotions unexplained. In what sense
are emotions such as anger, envy, hostility, hatred, and
resentment constituents of ressentiment if they must be
incorporated and mutated in order to become ressen‐
timent? Once incorporated and mutated by repression
and transvaluation, what is left of the emotions that con‐
stitute ressentiment? If these emotions lose their dis‐
crete identities and are amalgamated into ressentiment
that is something different, the other emotions appear
to be ingredients of ressentiment rather than its con‐
stituents. Alternatively, those emotions can be manifes‐
tations of ressentiment if the latter is understood as a
sentiment, a higher‐order affective attitude that mani‐
fests as thematically related emotions and attitudes, as
Aeschbach (2017) suggests. However, this interpretation
leaves the incorporation and mutation of the emotions
thatmanifest ressentiment in Demertzis’ view redundant
or mysterious. What is the function of these processes if
the emotions supposed to undergo those processes in
becoming ressentiment remain its manifestations?
Problems with ressentiment as a complex emotion
are also evident in TenHouten (2018). He argues that
ressentiment and resentment are two forms of the same
“tertiary‐level” emotion, “whose primary emotional com‐
ponents are anger, surprise, and disgust, and whose
secondary emotional components are contempt, shock,
and outrage” (TenHouten, 2018, p. 6). Resentment is
an active and forceful emotion, whereas ressentiment
is its passive and helpless shadow. This distinction
between resentment and ressentiment is consistent with
Nietzsche and Scheler, but also in tension with the view
that resentment and ressentiment are ultimately the
same “tertiary emotion” with the same constituent emo‐
tions. A widely accepted philosophical criterion is that
discrete emotions have a distinct “formal object” (Kenny,
1963) or “core relational theme” (Lazarus, 1991)—an
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evaluative property or content that particular instances
of the same emotion type ascribe to the intentional
object of emotion, an event, situation, person, etc. For
instance, the formal object of fear is the evaluative prop‐
erty of “being dangerous” that particular instances of
fear ascribe to their targets. If resentment and ressenti‐
ment are forms of the same emotion, they should have
the same formal object or core relational theme. Yet,
there is a wide agreement among researchers of ressen‐
timent that whatever it is, it differs from resentment,
usually understood as moral anger at injustice (e.g.,
Aeschbach, 2017; Demertzis, 2020; Meltzler & Musolf,
2002; Ure, 2014). The involvement of transvaluation and
the defences carrying it out in ressentiment (but not
in resentment) make it conceptually difficult to defend
a view of ressentiment and resentment as two forms
of the same emotion. This difference renders problem‐
atic TenHouten’s view that ressentiment and resentment
have the same constituent emotions: anger, disgust, and
surprise. This is a speculative view leaving the roles of
disgust and surprise unclear.
With the above concerns in mind, we make the fol‐
lowing propositions: Ressentiment is best understood
as a psychological mechanism that produces and rein‐
forces a sentiment—adisposition to have certain themat‐
ically related emotions and attitudes. Emotional mech‐
anisms have four conditions: (1) emotional dissonance;
(2) reappraisal; (3) change in the emotional response;
and (4) disposition of the emotional outcome to be
collectivized (Salmela & Salice, 2020). We extend this
account analysing the functioning of reappraisal in terms
of psychodynamic defences transmuting the self and its
values. The proposed view integrates the two main ele‐
ments of ressentiment in extant literature providing a
causal account of their mutual relationship. It explains
the dynamic character of ressentiment better than the
other views whose insights it also incorporates.
Agreeing with other scholars, we identify the axis of
ressentiment as victimhood (Aeschbach, 2017; Hoggett,
2018; Katsafanas, in press; Nietzsche, 1885/1961; Rodax
et al., 2021; Ure, 2014). A powerless sense of victimhood
may belong to inefficacious anger and envy where the
individual feels deprived, depleted, and inferior. An ana‐
logous powerless victim position also belongs to shame,
in which the subject attacks the self. This attack on the
self, if enduring, is so painful that the victimizer needs
to be externalized. To evade mental pain emerging from
negative feelings targeting the self, in ressentiment the
self‐reproaching victim position is transformed into a
morally superior victim position providing justification
for the other‐directed moral emotions of resentment,
indignation and hatred, as well as a foundation for the
formation of collective identities of victimhood.
Breaking with other scholars who see ressentiment
as an objectless emotion, not specifically about some‐
thing or someone (Demertzis, 2020), we identify two
objects of ressentiment: (1) the self, elevated from low
to high; and (2) the value of what one wants to have
(desired object in envy and anger) or to be (aspired
roles or identities in shame) reversed to undesired and
unwanted. Aeschbach (2017, p. 94) calls value change
of this kind a “strong ressentiment,” as distinct from the
“weak ressentiment” that merely denounces the value
of an unattainable particular object (such as particu‐
lar sweet grapes), without leading to a reversal in val‐
ues. He also observes, following Poellner (2011), that
transvaluation allows the subject to feel moral superi‐
ority, instead of feeling inferior and impotent. However,
neither Poellner nor Aeschbach see the self as an object
of ressentiment besides values, as we do.
We also identify two objectives of ressentiment:
(1) to change the self and its values (through transval‐
uation); and (2) to maintain the “new self” and “new
values” and emotions through social sharing. Although
attention has been provided to achieving transvaluation
through defences (see Demertzis, 2020, p. 138), the sec‐
ond objective is novel and under‐theorised. The power‐
less self in ressentiment comes to feel superior and pow‐
erful. This constitutes a reversal where the self changes
from worthless and incapable to pious and elevated.
This change requires the employment of defences and
goes beyond the improvement of self‐esteem by ressen‐
timent on which previous philosophical research focuses
(Aeschbach, 2017). We argue the self is transmuted in
ressentiment: With transvaluation, an individual’s iden‐
tity becomes disconnected from one’s sense of who one
is, generating a “fragmented self,” broken in two: an old
(painful) self, tucked away, and a new (elevated) self,
accepted as the “all‐good” self. This outcome is similar to
what Winnicott (1965, p.140) describes as a “false‐self.”
Through social sharing, this “new self” is maintained
and reinforced. Thus, we argue, the core objectives of
ressentiment are to change its very subject and maintain
its change.
If ressentiment involves repression, reaction forma‐
tion, splitting, regression, and denial (e.g., Aeschbach,
2017; Demertzis, 2020; Hoggett, 2018; Scheler, 1961), it
is worth focusing on how psychic defences are employed
throughout this mechanism, how they relate to the
thoughts and feelings serving as triggers, the evalua‐
tions of the self, prior to and after its transvaluation,
the transmutation of its values, the maintenance of
the “new self,” as well as to ressentiment outcomes.
It helps to introduce a few key properties of defences.
They are internal, complex, and (mostly) unconscious
regulatory processes of resisting/defending against men‐
tal frustrations, stress, and conflict; they alter percep‐
tions of the self, the other(s), thoughts, and feelings
(A. Freud, 1936; Vaillant, 1994). Psychologists agree that
any mental function (cognition, affect, and conation)
can be used defensively, and everyone needs and uses
defensive manoeuvres against mental pain at particular
times (Kernberg, 1976; Vaillant, 1994). We argue that
defences provide the analytical framework to consider
ressentiment as an emotional mechanism available to all
individuals without pathologizing or stigmatizing its use.
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Our systematic analysis of defences expands on scholars
who see their value in relation to ressentiment and pro‐
vides a framework that unpacks their functionwithin this
emotional mechanism.
Finally, our model theorises four stages of ressen‐
timent. First, the “triggering stage” involves the nega‐
tive emotions with feelings of inferiority and/or impo‐
tence as affective drivers of ressentiment. Experienced
as repeated assaults on the individual’s self‐esteem, they
compromise ego‐strength and lead to diminished capac‐
ity for adaptive psychic resistance. Second, the “initiat‐
ing stage” involves failed adaptive defences and regres‐
sion, followed by the adoption of partially adaptive or
maladaptive defences prior and en route to transvalua‐
tion. Third, the “advancing stage” involves maladaptive
defences delivering the transvaluation of the self and the
values. The outcomes of this stage are the sentiments of
“general negativism” (Scheler, 1961, p. 21)manifesting as
emotions of resentment, indignation, and hatred, and as
an anti‐stance of rejection towards objects perceived as
injurious or insulting, and the “new values” and a “new
self” as a precarious identity. Fourth, the “consolidat‐
ing stage” involves defences strengthening the transval‐
uation and the fragmentation of the self through social
sharing, preventing relapse to the “old self” and the
“old values” while bringing its outcomes into the politi‐
cal sphere.
3. Affective Drivers and Outcomes of Ressentiment
Viewing ressentiment as a psychological mechanism we
distinguish between affects and emotions that are its trig‐
gers and outcomes, building a causal argument into the
affective elements of ressentiment. Previous accounts
suffer this shortcoming, beginning with Scheler’s view of
its elicitors:
Revenge, envy, the impulse to detract, spite,
Schadenfreude, and malice lead to ressentiment only
if there occurs neither a moral self‐conquest (such as
genuine forgiveness in the case of revenge) nor an
act, or some other adequate expression of emotion
(such as verbal abuse or shaking one’s fist), and if
this restraint is caused by a pronounced awareness
of impotence. (Scheler, 1961, p. 6)
Importantly, revenge and the impulse to detract
are not emotions but rather action tendencies of
other emotions—anger and envy, respectively. Scheler
observes the desire to revenge is “preceded by an attack
or an injury” with the “accompanying emotions of anger
and rage” whose immediate reactive impulse is “tem‐
porarily or at least momentarily checked and restrained”
due to “the reflection that an immediate reaction would
lead to defeat, and by a concomitant pronounced feel‐
ing of ‘inability’ and ‘impotence’ ” (Scheler, 1961, p. 5).
Elsewhere he writes: “There is a particularly violent ten‐
sion when revenge, hatred, envy, and their effects are
coupled with impotence. Under the impact of that ten‐
sion, these affects assume the form of ressentiment”
(Scheler, 1961, p. 20).
Scheler thinks ressentiment emerges whenever the
subject of a negative emotion is incapable of either
acting on the emotion or even expressing it, thereby
“discharging’’ the emotion. The situations in which inabil‐
ity of this kind leads to ressentiment are “lasting situa‐
tions which are felt to be ‘injurious’ but beyond one’s
control—in other words, the more the injury is experi‐
enced as a destiny” (Scheler, 1961, p. 8). Scheler also
observes that “this psychological dynamite will spread
with the discrepancy between the political, constitu‐
tional, or traditional status of a group and its factual
power” (Scheler, 1961, p. 7), when members of a social
group or class experience a status loss in society. Salmela
and von Scheve (2017) note that the threat of a sta‐
tus loss can trigger the same psychological processes
as an actual loss. From this perspective, experiences of
impotence and inferiority resulting from emotions felt as
injuries or insults are perhaps more important drivers of
ressentiment than the identity of particular emotions to
which these feelings associate.
Even so, it seems some emotions fit this role better
than others. Scheler highlights two sources of ressenti‐
ment: the desire for revenge on the one hand, and envy,
jealousy, and competitive urge on the other. We have
already observed revenge is an action tendency of anger
rather than an independent emotion. More specifically,
Scheler speaks of an inefficacious anger whose action
tendency of revenge must be repressed, with ensuing
feelings of impotence and powerlessness. Envy and jeal‐
ousy involve these feelings as part of their phenomenol‐
ogy, as they are experienced when another person has
something we covet (envy), or threatens to rob us from
something we possess (jealousy). Scheler specifies that
envy “leads to ressentimentwhen the coveted values are
such as cannot be acquired and lie in the sphere in which
we compare ourselves to others” (Scheler, 1961, p. 9).
He observes that constant comparisons elicit and rein‐
force “oppressive feelings of inferiority” exacerbated by
the “system of free competition” in society. Therefore:
Ressentimentmust be strongest in a society like ours,
where approximately equal rights (political and other‐
wise) or formal social equality, publicly recognized, go
hand in hand with wide factual differences in power,
property, and education. While each has the “right”
to compare himself with everyone else, he cannot do
so in fact. (Scheler, 1961, pp. 7–8).
Even if Scheler wrote these words over a century ago, his
analysis strikes one as surprisingly timely. The contempo‐
rary liberal “rhetoric of rising” promises success to every‐
one who, with an equal chance, works hard to develop
one’s skills and talents. However, not everyone can win,
and individuals can blame only themselves if they lose in
the competition for meritorious positions, with resulting
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feelings of humiliation and resentment (Sandel, 2020)—
two emotions that we recognize as a driver and an out‐
come of ressentiment.
Another possible driver of ressentiment along with
envy is shame (Salmela & von Scheve, 2017). Shame is
felt when the subject fails to live up to, or even min‐
imally exemplify in behaviour, an important personal
value often shared with others as a core constituent of
a valued identity, such as a parent or partner or profes‐
sional (Deonna et al., 2012; Salmela, 2019). Importantly,
whereas in envy it is possible to denounce the value of
a particular object without denouncing the value itself,
thus engaging in only “weak ressentiment,” shame by
default comes with “strong ressentiment” because the
only way to avoid it is to change one’s values. Similar
to envy, shame involves feelings of impotence, inferior‐
ity, and powerlessness. Moreover, shame is a stigma‐
tized emotion in Western cultures where it is framed
as deviant, despised, socially undesirable, and there‐
fore inexpressible, associated with weakness, inferior‐
ity, defeat, and low status (Lewis, 1995; Walker, 2014).
Due to the painfulness of shame and its strongly nega‐
tive implications on the self, we are motivated to avoid
and repress it, with the consequence it turns into anger
(Lewis, 1971; Scheff, 1994; Turner, 2007). Finally, shame
is another key emotion besides envy in competitive, mer‐
itocratic societies. “When individuals cannotmeet expec‐
tations in encounters lodged in key institutional domains
or are negatively sanctioned in these encounters, it is
likely that they will experience shame” (Turner, 2007,
p. 517). Turner argues shame felt in different institutional
domains crops up and intensifies, increasing the pressure
towards repression.
Having identified envy, shame, and inefficacious
anger (and their adjacent feelings of impotence, inferi‐
ority and powerlessness that hurt the vulnerable self) as
the affective drivers of ressentiment, the next question is
which emotions are its outcomes. Scheler thinks ressen‐
timent does not change the type of a repressed emo‐
tion so much as its intentionality from a locally focused
emotion into a globally dispersed affective attitude. His
example is conscious hatred of a particular person that
through repression turns into a general negativism:
[A repressed emotion] becomes more and more
detached from any particular reason and at length
even from any particular individual. First it may come
to bear on any of my enemy’s qualities, activities, or
judgments and on any person, relation, object, or sit‐
uation which is connected with him in any way at
all. The impulse “radiates” in all directions. At last it
may detach itself even from theman who has injured
or oppressed me. Then it turns into a negative atti‐
tude towards certain apparent traits and qualities,
no matter where or in whom they are found….When
the repression is complete, the result is a general
negativism—a sudden, violent, seemingly unsystem‐
atic and unfounded rejection of things, situations, or
natural objects whose loose connectionwith the orig‐
inal cause of the hatred can only be discovered by a
complicated analysis. (Scheler, 1961, p. 21)
We suggest “general negativism” here is best under‐
stood as a sentiment manifesting as other‐directed neg‐
ative emotions such as anger and hatred as well as
an anti‐stance of rejection towards various things and
objects perceived as insulting or injurious. The disso‐
ciation of qualities from the original objects of emo‐
tion and their re‐association with other objects after
repression explains how Scheler is able to talk about
anger and hatred both as drivers of ressentiment and as
its outcomes.
There are reasons to believe anger and hatred are,
similarly to resentment and indignation, more often out‐
comes of ressentiment than its drivers. None of these
emotions—inefficacious anger excluded—involves the
feelings of impotence, powerlessness and inferiority we
have identified as central to the phenomenology of
the drivers of ressentiment. By contrast, they involve
the perspective of moral superiority or righteousness,
even when the subject is incapable of removing the felt
“injury” or “injustice” by acting on and/or expressing
the emotion, as is the case in hatred (see Aeschbach,
2017). There is evidence that hatred emerges through
consecutive instances of anger in which the subject per‐
ceives he or she is not capable of influencing the insult‐
ing behaviour of the target of emotion which in hatred
is appraised as immoral, malicious, and incapable of
change (Fischer et al., 2018; Halperin, 2008; Salice, 2020;
Szanto, 2019). Aeschbach (2017, pp. 146–153) observes
that blaming others allows the person of ressentiment
to discharge and express the repressed hostile emo‐
tions, especially envy, in the form of moral emotions,
resentment and indignation, which also counterbalance
a damaged sense of self‐worth with positive feelings of
moral superiority.
Yet the new values of a person of ressentiment rest
on self‐deception, which maintains a tension and the
need to reinforce the new values and the associated
emotions, again and again. Scheler and his philosophical
interpreters typically explain this tension by adopting a
realist view of values as objectively existing qualities per‐
ceivable by an intuitive faculty these theorists call “value
feeling” (Wertfühlen). Irrespective of whether a mental
act of this kind is possible, and whether there are mind‐
independent values in the first place, we suggest an alter‐
native explanation to the tension and vacillation in the
emotions of a person of ressentiment, drawing from psy‐
choanalytic theorizing on defences while detailing the
mechanism of ressentiment across four stages.
4. The four Stages of Ressentiment: Psychic Economy
and Defences
In our model, the triggering, initiating, advancing, and
consolidating stages of ressentiment have idiosyncratic
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duration and contain specific defences depending on an
individual’s psychic capacities. We approach defences as
a toolset individuals employ to deal with mental pain.
The combination of defensive coping strategies individ‐
uals adopt is idiosyncratic and depends on their levels of
ego‐strength and identity integration at that particular
time in their lives (Cramer, 1991).
Ego‐strength refers to one’s psychic capacity to tran‐
scend impulsive action, develop self‐control and self‐
reflection, overcome one’s illusions, cope with stress
and resolve conflicts (Carveth, 2018; A. Freud, 1936).
Because ego‐strength helps individuals maintain a cohe‐
sive sense of self‐identity, it is directly linked to iden‐
tity integration. Lack of ego‐strength (i.e., ego‐deficit)
can display as self‐deception, difficulty with reality test‐
ing, lack of cohesive identity, and emotion dysregu‐
lation (Erikson, 1959; A. Freud, 1936; Vaillant, 1993).
It follows that the defences individuals adopt have a
psychic cost expended in order to sustain them, or
these defences break down; furthermore, individuals’
efforts to sustain particular defences can overtime com‐
promise ego‐strength (A. Freud, 1936; S. Freud, 1894).
High ego‐strength is associated with the deployment
of adaptive (mature, high order) defences which pro‐
mote self‐realization. These are the “good mental cop‐
ing habits” (like creativity, humour, altruism, and subli‐
mation) enhancing psychosocial development. Although
individuals cope the best they can, some coping habits
can be destructive. Maladaptive (immature, low order)
defences are the “bad mental coping habits” which pro‐
vide comfort through self‐deception and distortion of
reality, can turn the individual against itself, and can
be socially unacceptable (Cramer, 1991; Erikson, 1959;
A. Freud, 1936; Klein, 1958; Vaillant, 1993). The above
invites us to consider the psychic economy of ressenti‐
ment by focusing on the ego‐strength capacities of indi‐
viduals, and identify the defences which can fend off
ressentiment and those which advance it.
The triggering stage involves repeated experiences of
deprivation, loss, and failure resulting in frustration. But
these do not necessarily lead to ressentiment. We argue
individuals have the psychic capacity to manage frustra‐
tions and negative emotions through adaptive defences
when their ego‐strength is high. Sublimation, humour,
altruism, and suppression are (mostly) conscious pro‐
cesses regularly employed by individuals to alleviate suf‐
fering by deflecting stress andmitigating unresolved con‐
flicts (Cramer, 2015). Because these defences strengthen
the emotional integrity of the individual and are liberat‐
ing from mental pain, they are associated with adaptive
functioning. We expect the self‐reproaching feelings of
inferiority or impotence to not be pronounced, the frus‐
trating event to not be perceived primarily as an attack to
the self, and ressentiment to be fended off, when frustra‐
tion andmental suffering can be sublimated, temporarily
suppressed, or addressed with humour.
The initiating stage starts with failing to deal with
conflict‐generating realities, either because ego‐strength
is depleted and adaptive defences break down, or
because an underdeveloped self cannot deploy adaptive
defences in the first place. The first step is a psychic
regression, a return to a vulnerable psychological state.
According to A. Freud (1936) when individuals regress,
mental pain takes the form of anxiety, depression, fear,
anger, envy, shame, pining. We note that envy, shame,
and inefficacious anger, the emotional foundations of
the victimhood axis, present repeated failures as attacks
to the self, making the possibility of a positive outcome
untenable. We argue that in the initiating stage defences
aim to mentally bypass the negative affects by distort‐
ing facts and reality. Individuals engage in ressentiment
not because of a pathological need or malevolence, but
because they seek to rid themselves from the emotional
pain caused by feelings of impotence and inferiority,
and the embarrassing thoughts of the self as unworthy.
In essence, ressentiment aims at ending this repetition
of failure and its associated feelings through transvalu‐
ating. In this stage, we identify affective and cognitive
defensive manoeuvres whereby the individual (1) dislo‐
cates negative affects from cognitions and evaluations
that feed those affects (through repression of affect and
isolation/dissociation), and (2) reattaches these affects
to other cognitions and evaluations (through displace‐
ment/substitution and reaction formation/reversal).
“Dislocation defences” in ressentiment involve the
repression of affect and the dissociation of cognitions.
Repression targets emotions, preventing from making
conscious the disturbing feelings attached to frustrating
thoughts (memories, wishes, ideas). Repression requires
ego‐strength to be maintained and when it breaks
down, “the return of the repressed” manifests as gener‐
alised anxiety, dysfunctional behaviour or somatization
(A. Freud, 1936). Scheler (1961, p. 49) argues that ressen‐
timent contains the repression of the vindictiveness and
the repression of the imagination of vengeance, while
Demertzis (2020) notes the repression of the object of
desire (p. 127), and the repression of negative emo‐
tions (p. 133). Dissociation/isolation targets cognitive
elements, whereby the individual isolates frustrations in
one aspect of their life or the self, leaving other aspects
relatively unscathed (Freud, 1936). The value of dissocia‐
tion is acknowledged in ressentiment (Demertzis, 2020).
By placing the thoughts of one’s inability to attain a goal
in separate mental compartments not allowed to meet,
the ressentimentful individual expends ego‐strength to
avoid dealing with mental pain.
“Reattachment defences” in ressentiment involve dis‐
placement and reaction formation. Displacement (sub‐
stitution) of affect redirects negative affect to a more
acceptable object, either outward towards an external
object (generating anger), or inward towards the self
(generating shame) when it is not possible to displace
outward. The original object is substituted outward with
an external object or substituted inward with the self
(A. Freud, 1936). Several scholars highlight the impo‐
tence and weakness of those who turn their negative
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affect, related to their repeated failure, towards aweaker
target (Aeschbach, 2017; Demertzis, 2020; Nietzsche,
1961; Scheler, 1961; Ure, 2014). We make a distinction
here between this short‐lived displacement of negative
affect at available surrogate objects experienced in this
initiating stage of ressentiment vs. the chronic and venge‐
ful resentment at any scapegoats perceived as funda‐
mentally evil and/or persecutory, present at the advanc‐
ing stage of ressentiment. This, we think corresponds
to the “weak vs. strong ressentiment” distinction by
Aeschbach (2017).
Reaction formation, another reattachment defence,
blends the repression of the original rejected affect or
desire, with the exaggeration of its direct opposite. The
individual no longer feels anxious, but confident; it is not
uncertain, but certain; it is not weak, but strong. The
value of reaction formation in ressentiment is already
acknowledged (Demertzis, 2020), however we note a
crucial point: Its exaggerated affective opposition can
be expressed as intense antipathy towards the coveted
and unattainable object (in envy) or one’s valued iden‐
tity (in shame), but also as intense preoccupation with
this object or identity, to overcompensate for hatred
towards it. We argue this less appreciated function of
reaction formation noted by Freud (1936) is the rea‐
son behind the almost obsessive preoccupation of the
ressentimentful individual with victimhood: The origi‐
nal rejected emotions (anxiety, feelings of impotence,
powerlessness, worthlessness) are repressed but persist
unconsciously, and exaggeration is accompanied by com‐
pulsive preoccupation with the unattainable object or
identity. While reaction formation aims at the disavowal
of the desired object or valued identity, it actually feeds
feelings of injury and worthlessness.
Rationalization is another defensive manoeuvre and
involves the cognitive distortion of facts tomake a failure
less threatening. In ressentiment, the fox explains its fail‐
ure to reach the grapes because the ground is too soft, or
the vine too high. The grapes’ value is not altered yet, but
the rationale of the failure is comfortably reinterpreted.
This defence is achieved by inventing seemingly plausi‐
ble reasons why something happened, and in ressenti‐
ment it can create a cycle of self‐deception, not address‐
ing the original problem, but mitigating its frustration
(Aeschbach, 2017, p. 161).
The short‐term advantage of these largely uncon‐
scious and partially adaptive defences is that they
find side ways to deal with conflict and mental pain.
Their long‐term cost is that they compromise indi‐
viduals’ capacity to adapt to reality (S. Freud, 1894).
We argue that these defences can delay the advance‐
ment of ressentiment for individuals with sufficient ego‐
strength, if adopted short‐term. If adopted long‐term,
these defences can turn maladaptive and erode ego‐
strength further, because they do not allow individuals to
see the issues they face. This iswherewe identify the tran‐
sition between the initiating stage that displays as “weak
ressentiment,” and the advancing stage that displays as
“strong ressentiment.” For as long as partially adaptive
defences can be sustained as “temporary fixes,” making
use of ego‐strength capacities, the mechanism of ressen‐
timent remains initiating. The mental pain, temporarily
evaded, periodically returns compromising the individ‐
ual’s ego‐strength. Our developing argument is thatwhen
ego‐strength is eventually depleted, these defences col‐
lapse, and ressentimentmoves to its next stage.
The advancing stage of ressentiment engages the
transvaluation, offering a long‐lasting, even chronic, way
around the frustrating conflicts. The “old self” is denied
(imagine the fox claiming it was never a weak/impotent
fox; rather it renounced its pursuit on its own free will);
what was valued in the coveted object or one’s identity
is denied (the grapes were always sour, only losers want
these grapes); the “new self” and the “new values” are
now “all good” and those perceived as responsible for
the failures of the “old self” are “all bad.” These are signs
that the ressentimentful individual has lost the ability
to engage with internal and external objects as “whole”
(having both good and bad aspects). The ressentiment‐
ful individual holds the firm belief these “spiteful others”
are aggressive, hostile, and vengeful, they feel hatred,
destructive envy, and anger. In response the ressenti‐
mentful individual feels a strong sense of injustice and
hypervigilance in its morally elevated victimhood.
In the above, we identify the denial of facts, splitting,
and projection, defences which are considered develop‐
mentally simple and cognitively undemanding (A. Freud,
1936). When ego‐strength is weak or depleted, it is pos‐
sible to sustain defences which require fewer psychic
resources (Klein, 1958). The denial of facts (to be dis‐
tinguished from repression of affect) is a simple psychic
manoeuvre involving the negation of a fact by employ‐
ing a fantasy. Splitting (Klein, 1959) involves the sim‐
plification of reality into all‐bad and all‐good objects.
Adaptive and developmentally essential in infancy, split‐
ting is problematic in adult life which presupposes the
recognition the world and the self are not “only good”
or “only bad” (Klein, 1958). Simply put, as one matures,
one gradually learns to engage with objects as whole
(having both good and bad aspects) and tolerate the
ambivalent feelings (e.g., love and hatred) one experi‐
ences when relating to others. The ressentimenful indi‐
vidual, we argue, splits the world into “only good” or
“only bad” parts, failing to relate to itself and to others
as whole objects. In this stage, we also see projection as
responsible for the persecutory anxiety of the ressenti‐
mentful individual, which is deeper than the temporary
venting of one’s anger by blaming weak targets (the dis‐
placement defence in the initiating stage). Studies in psy‐
chology outline the key feature of projection: All the bad
and painful for the self is projected out (Bion, 1957; Klein,
1959).When the bad parts of the ressentimentful self are
seen in “the other,” the ressentimentful individuals feel
they are not hateful or hostile; the “others” are.
As the advancing stage completes, we see the
first stage of “ego‐fragmentation”: The ressentimentful
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individual is isolated from its sense of self, its original
values, and the conflict‐generating reality. The employed
maladaptive defences impair one’s ability to relate to
one’s self and the world by compromising reality test‐
ing. Thus, we argue, ressentiment offers a solution, not a
resolution: The individual has no other means of dealing
with its already compromised vision of psychic reality but
avoiding it, unable to confront it, or resolve it. The origi‐
nally impotent self is replaced by an “all‐good new self”
and what was valued in the unattainable object or one’s
valued identity is compensated by new values. Whereas
in the initiating stagepartially‐adaptive defences provide
temporary solutions, in the advancing stage, through
transvaluation, we see the radical and long‐lasting distor‐
tion of an inconvenient and painful reality.
Ressentiment is not complete until the consolidating
stage, whereby “ego‐fragmentation” and the outcomes
of transvaluation are sustained through social interac‐
tions with peer‐others. We note that such social inter‐
actions have a dual function: They regenerate psychic
capacities through validation and confirmation, provid‐
ing resistance to the return of the repressed, and offer
recurrent opportunities to displace old and new envy
and frustrations onto enemy‐others. Adding to schol‐
ars who see social sharing as the opportunity to vali‐
date substituted values (Latif et al., 2018; Posłuszna &
Posłuszny, 2015; Salmela & von Scheve, 2017), we stress
that social sharing also, and primarily, validates the “new
self” through mirroring and idealizing in the interactions
with peer‐others.
Studies in psychology identify idealization and mir‐
roring as two central needs towards psychic develop‐
ment (Kohut, 1984; Winnicott, 1971) and note how rela‐
tionships with peers serve as an “identity kit” in social
interactions (Laing, 1961, p. 70). We see important par‐
allels when the ressentimentful individual comes in con‐
tact with peer‐others: Mirroring provides recognition
and reinforces the superficial “new self” feeling pride
rather than shame, satisfaction rather than disappoint‐
ment, being somebody rather than nobody, counting for
something rather than nothing. We argue that, in this
stage, defences of introjection and projection are in a
steady feedback loop, reinforcing the establishment of
the “new self” and maintaining “ego‐fragmentation.”
With introjection, the idealised “all‐good” peer‐
others are taken in the “new self” in an illusion of supe‐
riority. We argue that the ressentimentful individual,
unable to have a realistic appreciation of the peers and
the self seen as “part‐good, part‐bad,” feels depleted
in self‐comparison with the “all‐good” peers. We use
the concept of “unconscious envy” borrowing from Klein
(1958). We theorise that the ressentimentful individual,
perceiving the peers as “all‐good” providers of “good‐
ness” by association, experiences anxiety of not being
“as good” as them.
Furthermore, this “all‐good, all‐bad” comes in moral
terms and reinforces the identity of righteous vic‐
timhood experienced in ressentiment (Hoggett, 2018).
However, we suggest an identity based on victimhood is
hollow insofar as it is founded on the precarious “new
self.” Therefore, when the sharing of a collective identity
of victimhood stops, the ressentimentful individual loses
the mirrors giving it a reference point and experiences
the mental pain of feeling again worthless and alone.
5. Beyond the Self: The Political Implications of
Bonding Through Ressentiment
Social sharing of the transformed values and emotions
reinforces them providing a sense of warrant or objectiv‐
ity (Smith et al., 2007). It also facilitates the emergence of
other shared emotions such as group pride and feelings
of togetherness, supporting social cohesion and solidar‐
ity within the group bonded by ressentiment. To share
an emotion, its intentional target typically has to be gen‐
eralized. Thus, resentment, anger, or hatred emerging
from ressentiment, target groups whose members are
perceived to possess common negative characteristics,
or target individuals (political leaders, celebrities) asso‐
ciated with such groups. Scheler observes negative atti‐
tudes towards traits and qualities are detached from
their original targets and become attached to targets of
negative attitudes wherever they are found. Scheler also
recognizes the importance of social sharing in ressen‐
timent. However, it is Nietzsche who emphasizes the
role of social sharing most among both classic and con‐
temporary theorists of ressentiment (yet see Katsafanas,
in press):
All the sick and sickly strive instinctively for a herd‐
organization, out of a longing to shake off dull
lethargy and the feeling of weakness: the ascetic
priest senses this instinct and promotes it; wherever
there are herds, it is the instinct of weakness that has
willed the herd and the cleverness of the priests that
has organized it. For it should not be overlooked: the
strong are as naturally inclined to strive to be apart
as the weak are to strive to be together. (Nietzsche,
1885/1961, pp. 100–101)
Nietzsche argues the ascetic priests regulate the emo‐
tions of the ressentimentful individuals. Priests direct
hatred and vengefulness towards “the rich, the noble
and powerful,” claiming “you are eternally wicked, cruel,
lustful, insatiate, godless, you will also be eternally
wretched, cursed and damned!” (Nietzsche, 1885/1961,
p. 17). Priests also make the weak and suffering individu‐
als blame themselves for their condition by inventing sin
as an explanation for their suffering and guilt as an emo‐
tional antidote to sin. This way, priests are invaluable reg‐
ulators of the emotions emerging from ressentiment.
We see structurally similar dynamics in contempo‐
rary reactionary political movements driven by ressen‐
timent: blaming scapegoats such as political and cul‐
tural elites, immigrants, refugees, the long‐term unem‐
ployed, for the victimization of the ingroup; turning
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ressentiment‐mediated moral emotions of anger, resent‐
ment, and hatred towards these groups; the influence
and suggestion of charismatic leaders whose affective
rhetoric effectively contributes to their supporters’ emo‐
tion regulation (Kazlauskaite & Salmela, 2021; Salmela
& von Scheve, 2017). Sharing of other‐directed nega‐
tive emotions in social interaction reinforces and vali‐
dates these emotions. It also gives rise to positive col‐
lective emotions such as pride and moral righteousness
about shared victim identities of those united in anger
and resentment (Turner, 2007). Shared moral emotions
are empowering, and remaining feelings of inferiority
and powerlessness can be refashioned as manifestations
of moral victimhood. When collective pride comes with
prejudice and hostility towards outgroups, it qualifies
as hubristic (Sullivan & Day, 2019), and promotes col‐
lective narcissism (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009). This
link between collective narcissism and ressentiment is
explored in Capelos et al. (2021).
A similar dynamic applies to hatred emerging from
repressed inefficacious anger: the interpretation of
hatred as group‐based allows its sharing. This may
explain why hatred tends to generalize to groups
even if it would originate from individual‐level anger.
Collectivization of hatred is so common, several authors
have argued it to be the paradigmatic type of hatred
(see, e.g., Szanto, 2019). Moreover, shared hatred rein‐
forces the collective identity of victimhood and the asso‐
ciated feelings of togetherness, rendering the experience
of shared hatred predominantly, if not entirely, pleasant.
In the contemporaryworld, emotional sharingmay occur
offline and online as social media offers venues for cul‐
tivating collective anger, hatred and positive collective
emotions about shared social identities.
6. Conclusions
We have argued ressentiment is an emotional mecha‐
nism centred on victimhood and has two objects: the
self and the unattainable object or one’s valued identity.
The function of ressentiment is the evasion of mental
pain emerging from negative feelings targeting the vul‐
nerable self through transvaluation of the self from infe‐
rior, failing, a loser, into a noble, pious, and superior vic‐
tim, and of an unattainable object or valued identity into
an undesired one. In these transvaluations, ressentiment
employs largely idiosyncratic defences depending on the
individual’s ego‐strength. Ressentiment is driven by envy,
shame, and inefficacious anger, with their associated
feelings of inferiority and impotence. With a transval‐
uation these negative emotions are projected towards
“all‐bad’’ others in the form of resentment, indignation,
and hatred, and are reinforced and validated by social
sharing and introjection of “all‐good” peers.
We understand the combination of defences in
ressentiment as a “corkscrew,” its helix gripping into
the layers of an injured and poorly integrated self.
A response to real frustrations and unbearable suffer‐
ing, ressentiment has a high cost for the individual in the
long run as it does not provide actual fulfilment through
resolution of the original problems. The ressentimentful
individual cannot tolerate frustrations, maintain hope,
bear delays in gratification, acknowledge the disjunction
between reality and self‐deception, recognize oneself
and others as both good and bad, and avoid despair‐
ing. The corkscrew of ressentiment produces individu‐
als whose psychology brings to mind the words of Laing
(1961, p. 133): “With no real future of their own, they
may be in that supreme despair which is, as Kierkegaard
says, not to know they are in despair.”
We end by elaborating the political implications of
ressentiment. This emotional mechanism constitutes the
affective core of reactionism, a long‐lasting political ori‐
entation bundling anti‐preferences, resentful affect, and
the desire to break away from the present and rein‐
state a status quo ante (Capelos & Demertzis, 2018;
Capelos & Katsanidou, 2018), what Bauman (2017)
called “Retrotopia.” Ressentiment is key for understand‐
ing reaction: It transforms citizens’ conventional right or
left political orientations to backward‐oriented values,
which can be expressed as anti‐preferences, intolerance
towards outgroups andminorities, and dormant support
for illegal and violent actions (Capelos&Demertzis, 2018;
Capelos et al., 2017; Godwin & Trischler, 2021; Mayer &
Nguyen, 2021; Sullivan, 2021).
Besides motivating hostility towards outgroups (Kiss,
2021; Sullivan, 2021), ressentiment constitutes a volatile
basis for ingroup dynamics. The ressentimentful individ‐
ual has hollow peer relationships, seeking peers’ recogni‐
tion of the “new self” while defensively suspecting them.
Since the desire for recognition is important, the suspi‐
cion remains latent and unconscious, to avoid being torn
between opposite motives. Still the suspicion is there,
corroding the twinship bond of ressentiment. We see its
manifestations in reactionist political movements whose
interpersonal bonds flare up into bitter feuds between
fractions whose members accuse each other as traitors
of the common cause. The ease in which these abrupt
and violent rifts emerge indicates the latent suspicion of
others is dormant. Gronfeldt et al. (2021) highlight the
propensity of collective narcissists to sacrifice in‐group
members to defend the image of their group, and Szanto
(in press) identifies phenomena of “fraternity‐terror”
and internal threat in fanatics’ groups. These findings beg
further exploration and can be illuminated by the sys‐
tematic understanding of the emotional mechanism of
ressentiment in the context of grievance politics.
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